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Abstract
The computational characterization of game–
theoretic solution concepts is a central topic in arti-
ficial intelligence, with the aim of developing com-
putationally efficient tools for finding optimal ways
to behave in strategic interactions. The central so-
lution concept in game theory is Nash equilibrium
(NE). However, it fails to capture the possibility
that agents can form coalitions (even in the 2–agent
case). Strong Nash equilibrium (SNE) refines NE
to this setting. It is known that finding an SNE is
NP–complete when the number of agents is con-
stant. This hardness is solely due to the existence
of mixed–strategy SNEs, given that the problem of
enumerating all pure–strategy SNEs is trivially in
P . Our central result is that, in order for a game
to have at least one non–pure–strategy SNE, the
agents’ payoffs restricted to the agents’ supports
must, in the case of 2 agents, lie on the same line,
and, in the case of n agents, lie on an (n − 1)–
dimensional hyperplane. Leveraging this result, we
provide two contributions. First, we develop worst–
case instances for support–enumeration algorithms.
These instances have only one SNE and the support
size can be chosen to be of any size—in particular,
arbitrarily large. Second, we prove that, unlike NE,
finding an SNE is in smoothed polynomial time:
generic game instances (i.e., all instances except
knife–edge cases) have only pure–strategy SNEs.
1 Introduction
The computational characterization of game–theoretic solu-
tion concepts is a central topic in artificial intelligence, with
the aim of developing computationally efficient tools for find-
ing optimal ways to behave in strategic interactions. The
central solution concept provided by game theory is Nash
equilibrium (NE). Every finite game admits at least one NE
in mixed strategies. Computer scientists have characterized
the complexity of NE finding and provided a number of al-
gorithms. Finding an NE of a strategic–form (aka normal-
form) game is PPAD–complete [Daskalakis et al., 2006]
even with just two agents [Chen et al., 2009]. Such games are
called bimatrix games. Although PPAD ⊆ NP , it is gen-
erally believed that PPAD 6= P and therefore that there not
exists any polynomial–time algorithm to find an NE unless
P = NP . Furthermore, bimatrix games do not have a fully
polynomial–time approximation scheme unless PPAD ⊆
P [Chen et al., 2009] and finding an NE in bimatrix games is
not in smoothed–P unlessPPAD ⊆ RP [Chen et al., 2006]
and, therefore, by definition of smoothed complexity, game
instances remain hard even if subjected to small pertur-
bations. Instances [Savani and von Stengel, 2006] that re-
quire exponential time when solved with a number of
algorithms [Lemke and Howson, 1964; Porter et al., 2009]
are known. (However, these instances are unstable:
they become easy when small perturbations are ap-
plied [Gatti et al., 2012].)
NE captures the situation in which no agent can gain
more by unilaterally changing her strategy. When agents
can form coalitions and change their strategies multilaterally
in a coordinated way, the most natural solution concept is
strong Nash equilibrium (SNE) [Aumann, 1960]. An SNE
is a strategy profile from which no coalition can deviate in a
way that benefits each of the deviators. SNE has significantly
different properties than NE. An SNE is not assured to exist.
Finding an SNE (determining if one exists) is NP–complete
when the number of agents is constant; NP–hardness was
proven in [Conitzer and Sandholm, 2008] and membership
in NP in [Gatti et al., 2013]. Unlike for NE, the literature
has very few algorithms for SNE. There are algorithms for
finding pure–strategy SNEs for specific classes of games,
e.g., congestion games [Holzman and Law-Yone, 1997;
Hayrapetyan et al., 2006; Rozenfeld and Tennenholtz, 2006;
Hoefer and Skopalik, 2010], connec-
tion games [Epstein et al., 2007], maxcut
games [Gourve`s and Monnot, 2009], and continuous
games [Nessah and Tian, 2012]. However, the hardness
in the general setting is due to the existence of mixed–
strategy SNEs, given that the pure–strategy ones can be
found in polynomial time by combining support enu-
meration and verification. The only prior SNE–finding
algorithm that works also for mixed strategies is only
for 2–agent games [Gatti et al., 2013]. Its application
to instances from the ubiquitous NE benchmark testbed,
GAMUT [Nudelman et al., 2004], shows that these instances
either admit pure SNEs or do not admit any SNE and
therefore that new benchmark testbeds for SNE–finding
algorithms are needed.
In this paper, we provide the following main contributions.
• We show that, if there is a mixed–strategy SNE, then the
payoffs restricted to the actions in the support must sat-
isfy specific conditions. For example, in 2–agent games,
they must lie on the same line in agents’ utilities space.
• We show how to generate 2–agent games with m actions
per agent, only one SNE, and any desired number of ac-
tions {1, . . . , m2 } in the support of each agent’s mixed
strategy. These are the worst–case instances for support–
enumeration algorithms, requiring time O(4m2 ).
• We show that, for any number of agents, finding an
SNE is in smoothed–P , thus admitting a deterministic
support–enumeration algorithm with smoothed polyno-
mial running time. In the generic case (i.e., in all except
knife–edge cases), all SNEs are pure.
2 Preliminaries
A strategic–form game is a tuple (N,A,U)
where [Shoham and Leyton-Brown, 2008]:
• N = {1, . . . , n} is the set of agents (we denote by i a
generic agent),
• A = {A1, . . . , An} is the set of agents’ actions and Ai
is the set of agent i’s actions (we denote a generic action
by a, and by mi the number of actions in Ai),
• U = {U1 . . . , Un} is the set of agents’ utility arrays
where Ui(a1, . . . , an) is agent i’s utility when the agents
play actions a1, . . . , an.
We denote by xi(ai) the probability with which agent i plays
action ai ∈ Ai and by xi the vector of probabilities xi(ai) of
agent i. We denote by ∆i the space of well–defined probabil-
ity vectors over Ai. We denote by Si the support of agent i,
that is, the set of actions played with positive probability, and
by S the support profile (S1, . . . , Sn).
The most central solution concept in game theory is NE. A
strategy profile x = (x1, . . . ,xn) is an NE if, for each i ∈
N , xTi Ui
∏
j 6=i x−j ≥ x
′T
i Ui
∏
j 6=i x−j for every x′i ∈ ∆i.
Every finite game admits at least one NE in mixed strategies.
The problem of finding an NE can be expressed as:
vi −
∑
a−i∈A−i
Ui(ai, a−i) ·
∏
j∈N :
j 6=i
xj(aj) ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ N, ai ∈ Ai (1)
xi(ai) ·
(
vi −
∑
a−i∈A−i
Ui(ai, a−i)·
·
∏
j∈N :
j 6=i
xj(aj)
)
= 0 ∀i ∈ N, ai ∈ Ai (2)
xi(ai) ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ N, ai ∈ Ai (3)∑
ai∈Ai
xi(ai) = 1 ∀i ∈ N (4)
Here vi is the expected utility of agent i. Constraints (1) force
the expected utility vi to be non–smaller than the expected
utility given by every action ai available to agent i. Con-
straints (2) force the expected utility vi of agent i to be equal
to the expected utility given by every action ai that is played
with positive probability by agent i. Constraints (3) force
each probability xi(ai) to be nonnegative. Constraints (4)
force each probability vector xi to sum to one.
An SNE [Aumann, 1960] strengthens the NE concept by
requiring the strategy profile to be resilient also to multilateral
deviations by any coalition of agents. That is, in an SNE no
coalition of agents can deviate in a way that strictly increases
the expected utility of each member of the coalition, again
keeping the strategies of the agents outside the coalition fixed.
So, an SNE combines two notions: an SNE is an NE and it
is weakly Pareto efficient over the space of all the strategy
profiles for each possible coalition. Unlike an NE, an SNE is
not assured to exist even in mixed strategies.
Multi–objective programming provides Pareto optimal-
ity conditions [Miettinen, 1999], based on Karush–Kuhn–
Tucker (KKT) results. These conditions are:∑
i
λi · ∇fi(z) +
∑
j
µj · ∇gj(z) +
∑
k
νk · ∇hk(z) = 0 (5)
µj · gj(z) = 0 ∀j (6)
λi, µj ≥ 0 ∀i, j (7)∑
i
λi = 1 (8)
where fi(z) are the objective functions to minimize, gj(z)
are inequality constraints as gj(z) ≤ 0, and hk are equality
constraints as hk(z) = 0. The λi, µj , νk are called KKT mul-
tipliers; λi is the weight of objective function fi, µj is the
weight of constraint gj , and hk is the weight of constraint hk.
The KKT conditions (5)–(8) are necessary conditions for
local Pareto efficiency [Miettinen, 1999]. For games, we can
map these conditions to the case of Pareto efficiency for a
single coalition C ⊆ N as follows:
• fi is agent i’s expected utility multiplied by ‘−1’ (given
that in KKT the objective fi is to minimize);
• gj is a constraint of the form −xi(ai) ≤ 0;
• hk is a constraint of the form
∑
ai∈Ai xi(ai)− 1 = 0.
3 Characterization of mixed–strategy SNEs
We study the properties of mixed–strategy SNEs. We focus
on the basic case of 2–agent games and we discuss how the
reasoning can be extended to games with 3 or more agents.
We denote by Pmix and by Pcor the sets of points in the
agents’ utility spaces E[U1] × E[U2] that are on the Pareto
frontier when the agents play mixed and correlated strategies,
respectively. Obviously, points in Pcor non–strictly Pareto
dominate points in Pmix, given that mixed strategies consti-
tute a subset of correlated strategies. In addition, we denote
by Pmix(S) and Pcor(S) the Pareto frontiers in mixed and
correlated strategies, respectively, when the game is restricted
to the sets of actions in support profile S.
Theorem 3.1 Consider a non–degenerate 2–agent game
with two actions per agent. If there is a mixed–strategy SNE,
then Pmix = Pcor.
Proof. We can write down the game as follows:
agent 2
ag
en
t1
a3 a4
a1 p1, q1 p2, q2
a2 p3, q3 p4, q4
By assumption:
• There is a mixed–strategy NE. Therefore:
x2(a3) · p1 + x2(a4) · p2 = x2(a3) · p3 + x2(a4) · p4 (9)
x1(a1) · q1 + x1(a2) · q3 = x1(a1) · q2 + x1(a3) · q4 (10)
• The NE is on Pmix, being an SNE. Therefore, the KKT
conditions are satisfied (since they are necessary condi-
tions for local weak Pareto efficiency):
−λ1 · (x2(a3) · p1 + x2(a4) · p2)−
−λ2 · (x2(a3) · q1 + x2(a4) · q2) = ν1 (11)
−λ1 · (x2(a3) · p3 + x2(a4) · p4)−
−λ2 · (x2(a3) · q3 + x2(a4) · q4) = ν1 (12)
−λ1 · (x1(a1) · p1 + x1(a3) · p3)−
−λ2 · (x1(a1) · q1 + x1(a3) · q3) = ν2 (13)
−λ1 · (x1(a1) · p2 + x1(a2) · p4)−
−λ2 · (x1(a1) · q2 + x1(a3) · q4) = ν2 (14)
By combining (9), (10) with (11)–(14), we obtain
x2(a3) · q1 + x2(a4) · q2 = x2(a3) · q3 + x2(a4) · q4 (15)
x1(a1) · p1 + x1(a2) · p3 = x1(a1) · p2 + x1(a2) · p4 (16)
By trivial mathematics, we can rewrite (9), (10), (15), (16) as
x2(a3) · (p1 − p3) = x2(a4) · (p4 − p2)
x1(a1) · (q1 − q2) = x1(a2) · (q4 − q3)
x2(a3) · (q1 − q3) = x2(a4) · (q4 − q2)
x1(a1) · (p1 − p2) = x1(a2) · (p4 − p3)
We can safely assume p1 6= p3, p2 6= p4, p1 6= p2, p3 6= p4,
and the analogous inequalities for agent 2, since this assump-
tion excludes only degenerate games. Indeed, if p1 = p3,
then, by the above conditions, we have p2 = p4, and there-
fore actions a1 and a2 are the same; if p1 = p2, then, by the
above conditions, we have p3 = p4, and therefore, in order
to have a mixed–strategy NE, we need p1 = p2 = p3 = p4.
The same reasoning holds for agent 2. Thus, we derive the
following conditions:
p1 − p2
p4 − p3
=
q1 − q2
q4 − q3
p1 − p3
p4 − p2
=
q1 − q3
q4 − q2
We can give a simple geometric interpretation of the above
conditions. Call Ri = (pi, qi). Each Ri is a point in the space
E[U1]× E[U2]. The above conditions state that:
• R1R2 is parallel to R3R4,
• R1R3 is parallel to R2R4,
and therefore R1, R2, R3, R4 are the vertices of a parallelo-
gram, see Fig. 1(a). Given that
• a mixed–strategy NE is strictly inside the parallelogram
(it being the convex (non–degenerate) combination of
the vertices), see Fig. 1(a), and that
• it must be on a Pareto efficient edge (since, if it is
strictly inside the parallelogram—as in Fig. 1(a)—then
it is Pareto dominated by some point on some edge),
we have that R1, R2, R3, R4 must be aligned according to a
line of the form E[U1]+φ ·E[U2] = const with φ ∈ (−1, 0),
see, e.g., Fig. 1(b). Thus, the combination of R1, R2, R3, R4
through every mixed–strategy profile lies on the line con-
necting the two extreme vertices; for example, in Fig. 1(b)
the extreme vertices are R2 and R1. It trivially follows that
Pmix = Pcor. 
The proof of the above theorem provides necessary condi-
tions for a game to admit a mixed–strategy SNE. These con-
ditions are not sufficient. Indeed, we can show that only some
alignments of R1, R2, R3, R4 can lead to an SNE:
0
1
2
3
0 1 2 3 4 5
b
b
b
b
b
R1 R4
R3
R2
NE
E[U1]
E
[U
2
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(a)
0
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0 1 2 3 4 5
b
b
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R1
R4
R3
R2
E[U1]
E
[U
2
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(b)
Figure 1: Examples used in the proof of Theorem 3.1.
Corollary 3.2 The only alignments of R1, R2, R3, R4 that
can lead to an SNE satisfy the following conditions:
• R1 or R4 is one extreme,
• moving from the previous extreme, the next vertex is R4
or R1,
• the next vertex is R2 or R3,
• R3 or R2 is the other extreme.
Proof. We initially show that it is not possible to have a
mixed–strategy NE for alignments different from those con-
sidered in the corollary. For reasons of space, we study a
single case, the proof in the other cases is similar. Con-
sider, for contradiction, the case in which R1 is the extreme
with the maximum E[U1], then the sequence is R2, R3, and
R4. It can be observed that the first action of the first agent
dominates the second action because U1(R1) > U1(R3)
and U1(R2) > U1(R4) and therefore the first agent will
play the first action with probability one. So, there is no
mixed–strategy NE. Instead, for the alignments considered
in the corollary, dominance does not apply, as shown, e.g., in
Fig. 2. 
agent 2
ag
en
t1
a3 a4
a1 3, 0 (R1) 0, 3 (R2)
a2 1, 2 (R3) 2, 1 (R4) 0
1
2
3
0 1 2 3 4 5
b
b
b
b
b SNE
R1
R4
R3
R2
E[U1]
E
[U
2
]
Figure 2: Example 2–agent game (left) and its Pareto frontier
(right).
We now extend the previous result to the setting in which
each agent has m actions and |S1| = |S2| = 2.
Corollary 3.3 Consider a non–degenerate 2–agent game
with m actions per agent. If there is a mixed–strategy SNE
with support sizes |S1| = |S2| = 2, then Pmix(S1, S2) =
Pcor(S1, S2).
Proof. We can split the NE constraints and KKT conditions
into two groups: those generated considering deviations to-
wards pure or mixed strategies over the supports S1 and S2
and those generated considering deviations towards pure or
mixed strategies over actions off the supports S1 and S2. The
constraints belonging to the first group are the same as in the
case with two actions per agent considered in the proof of
Theorem 3.1. The second group overconstrains the problem
and it is not necessary for the proof. Thus, restricting the
game to the actions in S1 and S2, Theorem 3.1 holds and
therefore Pmix(S1, S2) = Pcor(S1, S2), see, e.g., Fig. 3. 
agent 2
a5 a6 a7 a8
ag
en
t1
a1 3, 0 0, 3 −5,−5 −5,−5
a2 1, 2 2, 1 −5,−5 −5,−5
a3 −5,−5 −5,−5 5, 0 0, 0
a4 −5,−5 −5,−5 0, 0 0, 5 0
1
2
3
4
5
0 1 2 3 4 5
b SNE
E[U1]
E
[U
2
]
Figure 3: Example 2–agent game (left) and its Pareto frontier
(right).
Next we study the case of arbitrary–sized (potentially de-
generate) games admitting SNEs with full supports.
Theorem 3.4 Consider a 2–agent game with m1 and m2. If
there is a mixed–strategy SNE with |S1| = m1 and |S2| =
m2, then Pmix = Pcor.
Proof sketch. The proof is similar to the proof of Theo-
rem 3.1. Define Ri,j = (U1(i, j), U2(i, j)). By NE con-
straints and KKT conditions, we have that
• for all j,
∑
ai
x1(ai) · Ri,j = const (i.e., the convex
combinations of the elements of each column of the bi-
matrix must have the same value), and
• for all i,
∑
aj
x2(aj) · Ri,j = const (i.e., the convex
combinations of the elements of each column of the bi-
matrix must have the same value),
and we have that
• each convex combination is strictly inside the polygon
whose vertices are points Ri,j (because the combination
is not degenerate), and
• the combination must be on a Pareto efficient edge (oth-
erwise it would be Pareto dominated),
and therefore all the vertices must be aligned. In this way, the
combination of all the points Ri,j for every mixed strategy
leads to a point that lies on the line connecting all the Ri,j .
Thus we have Pmix = Pcor. 
The extension of Corollary 3.2 to the case with support size
larger than two is very involved and we omit it here due to
limited space. Instead, Corollary 3.3 easily extends to the
case in which the support per agent is larger than two (we
omit the proof because it is the same as that of Corollary 3.3).
Corollary 3.5 Consider a 2–agent game with m1 and m2. If
there is a mixed–strategy SNE with |S1| = m1 and |S2| =
m2, then Pmix(S1, S2) = Pcor(S1, S2).
We will now discuss how the above results extend to
more than two agents. For example, in the 3–agent set-
ting, the vector of payoffs for each action profile is Ri,j,k =
(U1(i, j, k), U2(i, j, k), U3(i, j, k)). The crucial result is that
necessary conditions, generated for only the actions in the
supports, for mixed–strategy SNEs forced by NE constraints
with KKT conditions for all the coalitions (i.e., {1, 2}, {1, 3},
{2, 3}, {1, 2, 3}) require that all the Ri,j,k lie on a plane (with
n–agent games, all the payoff vectors restricted on S must lie
on an (n− 1)–dimensional hyperplane). Thus, we have:
Theorem 3.6 Consider an n–agent game. If there is a
mixed–strategy SNE with support profile S then Pmix(S) =
Pcor(S).
The above theorem provides only some necessary conditions,
given that many other conditions, due to, e.g., dominance, are
required to have mixed–strategy SNEs. Interestingly, we can
show that there are vectors of payoffs that satisfy all these
conditions. For example, the following 3–agent game has a
mixed–strategy SNE in which all the agents randomize with
uniform probability over all their actions:
agent 2
a4 a5 a6
ag
en
t1 a1 1, 0, 0 0, 1, 0 0, 0, 1
a2 0, 1, 0 0, 0, 1 1, 0, 0
a3 0, 0, 1 1, 0, 0 0, 1, 0
Agent 3 plays action a7
agent 2
a4 a5 a6
ag
en
t1 a1 0, 1, 0 0, 0, 1 1, 0, 0
a2 0, 0, 1 1, 0, 0 0, 1, 0
a3 1, 0, 0 0, 1, 0 0, 0, 1
Agent 3 plays action a8
agent 2
a4 a5 a6
ag
en
t1 a1 0, 0, 1 1, 0, 0 0, 1, 0
a2 1, 0, 0 0, 1, 0 0, 0, 1
a3 0, 1, 0 0, 0, 1 1, 0, 0
Agent 3 plays action a9
4 Worst–case 2–agent instances for
support–enumeration algorithms
We now leverage the results from the previous section to show
that it is possible to generate games, with m actions per agent,
that have only one SNE, and the support size can be set any-
where in the range {1, . . . , ⌈m2 ⌉}. Thus, given m, we can
generate O(4m2 ) different game instances, each with a differ-
ent SNE. These game instances are the worst–case instances
for support–enumeration algorithms, given that, for each pos-
sible enumeration, it is possible to generate an instance that
requires the algorithm to scan an exponential number of sup-
ports.
We first introduce some results that we subsequently ex-
ploit to generate our hard instances.
Corollary 4.1 Given an even number m, consider the fol-
lowing two–agent game in which each agent has m = 2m
actions.
Ui =
[
U
1,1
i U
1,2
i
U
2,1
i U
2,2
i
]
where U j,ki are matrices m×m defined as follows:
U1,1
1
(i, k) =
{
1 if i + j odd
0 otherwise
U2,1
1
(i, k) =
{
−m if i = j
1 otherwise
U
1,2
1
(i, k) = −m
U2,2
1
(i, k) = 0
U
1,1
2
(i, k) =
{
1 if i + j even
0 otherwise
U2,1
2
= U1,2
1
U1,2
2
= U2,1
1
U
2,2
2
= U
2,2
1
This game has an SNE with support sizes |S1| = |S2| = m
and no other SNE.
Proof. Denote by A1i the first m actions of agent i and by
A2i the second m actions of agent i. For clarity we split the
proof into two parts, discussed in the following paragraphs,
respectively. An example game is in Fig. 4.
agent 2
a9 a10 a11 a12 a13 a14 a15 a16
ag
en
t1
a1 1, 0 0, 1 1, 0 0, 1 −m,−m −m, 1 −m, 1 −m, 1
a2 0, 1 1, 0 0, 1 1, 0 −m, 1 −m,−m −m, 1 −m, 1
a3 1, 0 0, 1 1, 0 0, 1 −m, 1 −m, 1 −m,−m −m, 1
a4 0, 1 1, 0 0, 1 1, 0 −m, 1 −m, 1 −m, 1 −m,−m
a5 −m,−m 1,−m 1,−m 1,−m 0, 0 0, 0 0, 0 0, 0
a6 1,−m −m,−m 1,−m 1,−m 0, 0 0, 0 0, 0 0, 0
a7 1,−m 1,−m −m,−m 1,−m 0, 0 0, 0 0, 0 0, 0
a8 1,−m 1,−m 1,−m −m,−m 0, 0 0, 0 0, 0 0, 0
0
0.5
1.0
1.5
0 0.5 1.0 1.5
b
SNE
E[U1]
E
[U
2
]
Figure 4: Example game that has an SNE with |S1| = |S2| = 4 = m (left), and its Pareto frontier (right).
There is an SNE with |S1| = |S2| = m. The strategy pro-
file in which each agent i plays all actions in A1i with uniform
probability 1m is an SNE. All the actions in the supports, i.e.,
A1i , provide utility 12 , while all the actions off the supports,
i.e., A2i , provide utility
1·(m−1)−m
m = −
1
m . Therefore, it is
an NE. Furthermore, the outcomes with utilities (1, 0) and
(0, 1) are Pareto efficient, and the others are (weakly) domi-
nated. Thus the Pareto frontier is a line that connects (1, 0) to
(0, 1); therefore the NE is Pareto efficient. So, it is an SNE.
There is no other SNE. We focus on the strategy of agent 2
(the same reasoning can be applied for agent 1). Suppose
agent 2 adopts a different strategy than the above uniform
strategy over A12. If agent 2 randomizes over a strict subset
of A12 composed of only odd actions or only even actions,
then agent 1 has two best responses, one in A11 and one in A21
(each provides agent 1 utility 1). However, there is no NE of
this form, given that, if agent 1 randomizes over such best re-
sponses, agent 2’s best response would be to play some action
in A22 with a positive utility in place of a utility of −m given
by the actions inA12. If agent 2 randomizes over a strict subset
ofA12 with even and odd actions, then agent 1 has one or more
best responses in A21 that provide utility 1 to agent 1. Also
in this case, if agent 1 randomizes over such best responses,
agent 2 would play some actions in A22 gaining 0 in place of
−m given by actions in A12. If agent 2 randomizes over less
than m actions in A12 and A22, then agent 1’s best response is
to play some action in A21. Also in this case agent 2’s best
response would be to play some action in A22. Finally, when
both agents play only actions in A2i or play more than m ac-
tions, we can have NEs, but these NEs are Pareto dominated
(because they are randomizations over Pareto–dominated out-
comes). 
Games with m odd are a simple variation w.r.t. the even
case (the proof is omitted being very similar):
Corollary 4.2 Given an odd number m, consider the follow-
ing two–agent game in which each agent has m = 2m ac-
tions.
Ui =
[
U
1,1
i U
1,2
i
U
2,1
i U
2,2
i
]
where U j,ki are matrices m×m defined as follows:
• U1,2i , U
2,1
i , U
2,2
i are generated as in the case of m even,
• U1,1i are composed of a submatrix (m − 1) × (m − 1)
generated as in the case of m even and all the other
entries are 12 .
This game has an SNE with support sizes |S1| = |S2| = m
and no other SNE.
We are now ready to define our hard–to–solve instances.
Definition 4.3 (Hard–to–solve instances) Given m and m,
if m ∈ {2, . . . , ⌊m2 ⌋}, a hard–to–solve game instance is com-
posed as follows:
• a sub–bimatrix of size 2m × 2m built as described in
Corollaries 4.1 and 4.2,
• all the other entries are drawn from {−m. . . , 0} with
uniform probability.
If m = 1, all the entries are drawn from {−m. . . , 0} with
uniform probability except for a pure action profile in which
both agents have a utility of 1.
Theorem 4.4 Hard–to–solve instances admit only one SNE.
Proof sketch. The SNE described in Corollaries 4.1 and 4.2
is still an SNE because all the additional entries are smaller
than the expected utility of the SNE. Because these additional
entries are Pareto dominated, no additional SNE exists. 
We leave open the extension to n–agent games.
5 Smoothed complexity of SNE finding
Worst–case complexity, being too pessimistic, is often a bad
indicator of the actual performance of an algorithm, and
average–case complexity is difficult to determine. A newer
metric of complexity, called smoothed complexity, has been
gaining interest in recent years [Bla¨ser and Manthey, 2012].
It studies how the introduction of small perturbations affects
the worst–case complexity. There might be several models of
perturbations. By far the most common perturbation models
are the uniform one and the Gaussian one.
In the case of the SNE-finding problem, given a perturba-
tion Dσ of magnitude σ, these are defined as follows.
• Uniform perturbation: for each agent i, every entry in
Ui is subjected to an additive perturbation [−σ,+σ] with
uniform probability.
• Gaussian perturbation: for each agent i, every entry in
Ui is subjected to an additive perturbation [−z,+z] with
probability 1
σ
√
2pi
e−|Ui(j,k)−z|
2/σ2
.
Denote by U˜i the perturbed utility matrix.
We will first present results for the 2–agent setting. In the
end of this section we show the generalization to any number
of agents.
The smoothed running time of an algorithmA given a per-
turbation Dσ is defined as
smoothed–tA = EU˜1,U˜2∼Dσ [tA(U˜1, U˜2)|U1, U2]
where tA(U˜1, U˜2) is the running time for the games instance
(U˜1, U˜2). An algorithm has smoothed polynomial time com-
plexity if for all 0 < σ < 1 there are positive constants
c, k1, k2 such that:
smoothed–tA = O(c ·mk1 · σ−k2 )
where m is the size of the game in terms of actions per agent.
Basically, a problem is in smoothed–P if it admits a smoothed
polynomial time algorithm.
Theorem 5.1 Finding an SNE is in smoothed–P .
Proof. We provide Algorithm 1. It has three main parts.
In the first part (Steps 1–3), the algorithm searches for a
pure–strategy SNE by enumerating all the pure–strategy pro-
files and verifying whether each strategy profile is an SNE.
The verification is accomplished by checking whether or not
NE constraints are satisfied (this can be done in polynomial
time in m) and by checking whether or not the strategy pro-
file is on the Pareto frontier (this can be done in polynomial
time as shown in [Gatti et al., 2013]). If an SNE is found, the
algorithm returns it. The maximum number of iterations in
the first part of the algorithm is m2.
In the second part (Steps 4–7), the algorithm verifies
whether there there are strategy profile of support sizes |S1|+
|S2| = 3 such thatPmix(S1, S2) = Pcor(S1, S2). This can be
accomplished in time O(m3) by checking whether there is a
line connecting at least three entries of all the sub–bimatrices
of size 2 × 2. In the affirmative case, the temporary variable
temp is set true. Otherwise, temp is set false.
In the third part (Steps 8–13), if temp is false, the algo-
rithm returns non–existence, given that, by Theorem 3.4,
there is no mixed–strategy SNE. Otherwise, the algorithm
enumerates all supports to find mixed–strategy NEs, and for
each of them the algorithm verifies whether it is an SNE as
done in Steps 1–3. In the latter case, the algorithm can take
exponential time as discussed in the previous section.
Thus, the running time of Algorithm 1 is super–polynomial
only if it needs to enumerate supports during Steps 8–13
(this can take exponential time). This happens only when
Pmix(S1, S2) = Pcor(S1, S2) for some S1, S2 with |S1| +
|S2| = 3. Given that the perturbations Dσ over all the
entries of the utility matrices are independent and identi-
cally distributed, the probability that the perturbed entries
are aligned as required by Corollary 3.5 to have SNEs with
|S1| = |S2| > 1 is zero. Therefore, the smoothed running
time of Algorithm 1 is polynomial in m and independent of
σ (for both uniform and Gaussian perturbations). 
The above result shows that, except for a space of the pa-
rameters with zero measure, games admit only pure–strategy
SNEs and therefore that verifying the existence of an SNE
and finding them is computationally easy. Interestingly, the
instability is due to the combination of NE constraints and
Pareto efficiency constraints. Indeed, both the problem of
finding an NE and the problem of finding Pareto efficient
strategies are not sensitive to perturbations. Thus, while an
approximate NE can be found by perturbing a game and find-
ing an NE of the perturbed game (exactly, an NE of an ǫ–
perturbed game is an 2ǫ–NE of the original game), this is not
the case with SNE. Indeed, if a game admits only mixed–
strategy SNEs, once perturbed, it does not admit any SNE.
Algorithm 1 SNEfinding
1: for all pure–strategy support profiles do
2: if the support profile has an SNE then
3: return the SNE
4: temp← false
5: for all strategy profiles with |S1|+ |S2| = 3 do
6: if payoffs restricted to supports are aligned then
7: temp← true
8: if not temp then
9: return non–existence
10: else
11: for all support profiles do
12: if the support profile has an SNE then
13: return the SNE
The above results extend to the setting with any (constant)
number of agents. As discussed in Section 3, in order to have
mixed–strategy SNEs with n agents, all the payoffs vectors
of the actions in the agents’ supports must lie on the same
(n − 1)–hyperplane. Thus, if perturbed even with small per-
turbations, the probability that the payoff vectors satisfy such
constraints is zero. Therefore, generic game instances (i.e., all
instances except knife–edge cases) have only pure–strategy
SNEs (if any).
6 Conclusions and future research
Strong Nash equilibrium (SNE) is the most natural solution
concept for games where agents can form coalitions, i.e., co-
ordinate their strategies. An SNE is a strategy profile where
no coalition can deviate in a way that every one of the devi-
ating agents (strictly) benefits. Given a finite game, a Nash
equilibrium always exists, but an SNE might not exist. For
finding an SNE, there has been a shortage of algorithms. Most
algorithms only find pure–strategy SNEs in special game
classes. A recent algorithm finds SNEs generally, but only
in 2–agent games.
Our central result is that, in order for a game to have at
least one mixed–strategy (i.e., non–pure–strategy) SNE, the
agents’ payoffs restricted to the agents’ supports must, in the
case of two agents, lie on the same line, and, in the case of n
agents, lie on an (n − 1)–dimensional hyperplane. Leverag-
ing this result, we provided two contributions. First, we de-
veloped worst–case game instances for support–enumeration
algorithms. These instances have only one SNE and the sup-
port size can be chosen to be of any size—in particular, arbi-
trarily large. In this way, for each possible enumeration, it is
possible to generate an instance that requires the algorithm to
scan an exponential number of supports. Second, we proved
that, unlike Nash equilibrium, finding an SNE is in smoothed
polynomial time: generic game instances (i.e., all instances
except knife–edge cases) have only pure–strategy SNEs.
In future research we plan to study the computational com-
plexity of approximating SNE and to design algorithms to
do so. We also plan to study computational issues related to
strong correlated equilibrium. This concept should present
different properties than SNE, e.g., the convexity of the Pareto
frontier with this solution concept could make the computa-
tion of an equilibrium easier and could make equilibria not
sensitive to small perturbations.
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